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CORPORATE PARENT LIABILITY UNDER
CERCLA IN UNITED STATES V. BESTFOODS:
TAKING Us BACK TO THE BASICS
EMILY MELVIN MOORING & RUTH LERNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1980, when Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),'
courts have been faced with the problem of determining who should
bear the liability for cleanup costs at chemical plants.2 The 1997
decision by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Cordova Chemical Co.
of Michigan3 sent ripples of concern through the environmental law
community. By holding that "no liability attaches unless the corporate
veil can be pierced," the Sixth Circuit ruled that a parent corporation
cannot be held directly liable under CERCLA.4
With this decision, the Sixth Circuit contravened both the
weight of authority on the subject and what many of the circuits felt to
be the intent of Congress to penalize all parties with direct
responsibility for pollutioni A recent article in the Journal of Land,
Resources, and Environmental Law called the case "a beacon of hope
for parent corporations hoping to dodge financial liability for polluted
sites owned by their subsidiaries;" few courts had held in favor of the
parent corporation prior to Cordova Chemical. 6 An extensively
.Senior Staff Members, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law; J.D., 2000
University of Kentucky.
IComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1996).
2See generally Joslyn Mfg. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); CPC Int'l., Inc. v. Aerojet-General
Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D.
Idaho 1986).
3113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997).
4Id. at 583.
5Matthew Leveridge, Note, CERCLA Liability for Parent Corporations After United
States v. Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan: Who Pays for Past Wrongs?, 13 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 199, 215 (1997-98).
6jennifer Rigby, Note, United States v. Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan:
Redefining the Parameters of Corporate Liability Under CERCLA, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 235 (1998).
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annotated article in the Villanova Law Review expressed concern that
the precedent set in Cordova Chemical Co. would persuade
corporations within the Sixth Circuit to incorporate subsidiaries that
deal with hazardous materials so as to avoid the possibility of parental
liability.
7
This comment focuses on the Supreme Court's ruling in United
States v. Bestfoods' and how the Court answers the derivative versus
direct liability split in the circuits. The Court accomplishes this by
reviewing a few basic concepts involved in holding a corporate entity
liable under CERCLA. Part II reviews the case history leading up to
the Supreme Court ruling. Part III examines the issues involved in the
legal background of the case. Part IV focuses on the Supreme Court's
opinion and the reasoning behind that opinion. Lastly, Part V contains
the authors' conclusions drawn from an analysis of the decision.
II. CASE HISTORY
The litigation in United States v. Cordova Chemical Co. of
Michigan9 centered around a contaminated site in Dalton Township,
Michigan, which was used from 1959 to 1986 as a chemical
manufacturing facility.'0 From 1957 to 1965, Ott Chemical Company
("Ott I") owned and operated the site." Ott I was purchased by CPC
International ("CPC") in 1965 through a wholly owned subsidiary that
later changed its name to Ott Chemical Company ("Ott 11").2 Ott II
operated the site from 1965 to 1972 under the direction and control of
CPC. 13 Ott I sold the site to Story Chemical Company in 1972.14 Story
operated the site until 1977 when the company declared bankruptcy. 5
In 1977, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
7See Amy C. Stovall, Comment, Limiting operator Liability For Parent Corporations
Under CERCLA: United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., 43 VILL. L. REV. 219 (1998).8 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997).
9113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997).
'0See CPC Int'l., Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 555 (W.D. Mich.
1991).
"ISee id.
12See id. at 558-62.
13See id. at 558-59.
14See id. at 555.
15See id.
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("MDNR") began investigating the amount of environmental damage
at the site. 6 Once the MDNR determined that environmental damage
existed at the site, it began looking for a purchaser who would be
willing to participate in the cleanup of the site. 7 In October of 1977,
Cordova Chemical Company ("Cordova/California"), a subsidiary of
Aerojet-General Corporation ("Aerojet"), purchased the site from
Story. 8 Cordova/California signed a "stipulation and consent order"
agreeing to pay for some cleanup at the site in exchange for a release
from liability for future cleanup costs.' 9 Cordova/California
subsequently created a wholly owned subsidiary, Cordova Chemical
Company of Michigan ("Cordova/Michigan"), and transferred
ownership to the subsidiary before any chemical manufacturing ever
began at the site.20
The contamination started in the groundwater that flows
underneath the site.2' Much of this contamination resulted during the
Ott I and Ott II eras from the use of unlined lagoons; the burial and
slitting of drums; spills of chemicals from train cars onto train tracks;
overflows of chemical waste at a cement-lined equalization basin; and
the dumping of hazardous chemicals into the woods.22 A suit was soon
brought to determine liablity under CERCLA for the cleanup costs
associated with the site's ongoing contamination.23
In CPC International Inc. v. Aerojet-General Co., the United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan recognized
that parent corporations could either be directly liable for operating the
site or liable through common law veil piercing.24 The court held CPC
directly liable as an operator of the site because it "actively participated
in and exerted significant control over Ott II's business and decision-
16See id. at 562.
17See id. at 563.
1t See id. at 555.
'"See id. at 566.20See id. at 568.
21See id.-at 555.
22See id. at 556.
23See id. at 556.
24See id. at 572.
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making."2 The question of whether or not CPC could also be held
liable through veil piercing was not reached.26 Common law veil
piercing, an equitable doctrine, disregards separate corporate existence
in circumstances where a corporation has used the separateness to
commit fraud.27
On appeal by Cordova/Michigan in United States v. Cordova
Chem. Co., a panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.2' The court of
appeals held that a parent corporation could not be held directly liable
for its subsidiary's facility by actively participating in the subsidiary's
affairs. Liability only attached to the parent corporation if the corporate
veil could be pierced.29 Moreover, the court determined that CPC's
corporate veil could not be pierced because it had not utilized the
corporate form to perpetrate a "fraud or wrong. 30  Soon after the
panel's opinion, the entire Sixth Circuit voted to hear the case en banc,
vacating the previous decision .3 The en banc opinion, in United States
v. Cordova Chem. Co., 2 held that a parent corporation could only be
held liable under CERCLA as an owner if the corporate veil could be
pierced, or as an operator if the parent operated the facility
independently or jointly with the subsidiary.33 The court further found
that CPC and Aerojet were not liable as owners or operators because
their corporate veils could not be pierced.34
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in
1997 to answer the question of when, and under what circumstances, a
25Id. at 574. The district court also found Aerojet and its subsidiaries liable. The
court held Cordova/Michigan liable as an operator of the site; as to Aerojet, the court pierced
its veil to make it liable. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
1995), vacated en banc, 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995).
26See id. at 573.
"See id. at 574.
2 8See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated en
banc, 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995).
'9See id. at 590.
30ld. at 591.
31See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995).
32 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997). Interestingly, the en banc decision was written by
Judge Norris, who wrote for the panel in the first case. As such, the en banc opinion codifies
to a large extent the Sixth Circuit's previous holding. See id.at 572.33See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1997).
"See id. at 581-83.
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parent corporation can be held liable under CERCLA. 35 Although the
Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit's rejection of the district court's
analysis of operator liability under CERCLA, it also ruled that the
Sixth Circuit's analysis was too narrow.36 The Supreme Court held that
a parent corporation can be liable in two ways: directly liable as an
operator that "actively participated in, and exercised control over, its
subsidiary's facility," or through piercing the corporate veil.37 The
Court then remanded to the district court for a determination of whether
or not CPC actually controlled or participated in the acts of the
facility.
38
III. ISSUES AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
& Liability Act was enacted in 1980 in response to the growing
concern over the dangers of hazardous wastes on human health and the
environment. 39 The Act empowers the federal government to clean up
hazardous waste sites and identify those responsible for the pollution.40
Through CERCLA, Congress holds those responsible for environmental
harm liable for the clean up of the polluted sites.4'
CERCLA defines a responsible party as any one of four
categories of "covered persons. '42 The issue in Bestfoods focuses on
the interpretation and application of the second category, namely
"owners or operators." The pertinent part of § 9607(a) reads "any
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed., 43 CERCLA defines "operator" as "any person owning or
operating such facility."44 Though this definition has been called
35See United States v. CPC Int'l, Inc. 1024 (1997).
36Bestfoods, I 18 S. Ct. at 1887.
37Id. at 1881.
381d. at 1890.
3942 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1996).
442 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1996).
4 1H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
4242 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4).
4342 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
4442 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A)(ii).
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circular,45 the term "person" is defined more broadly and encompasses
virtually any possible polluting entity, including a corporation.46
Separation of the term "owner" from "operator" has been held
to indicate that an operator is not protected by his legal position as an
owner if he can, in fact, be found to have acted as an operator of the
facility.47 In considering the appropriate standard, the Second Circuit,
in Schiavone v. Pearce,48 stated "an interpretation of CERCLA that
imposes operator liability directly ... is consistent with the general
thrust and purpose of the legislation. '49 A similar interpretation was
derived from the definition of the term "person." The Third Circuit in
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp.) found that
the inclusion of the term "corporation" under the definition of"person,"
indicated Congress' intent to hold a corporation liable for actions of a
subsidiary if it also operated the facility. 5' In the First Circuit, the
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp court,52 found no reason why a
parent corporation could not be held liable as an operator, concluding
that a "fair reading" of CERCLA allows a parent to be held liable as an
operator under CERCLA 3 Thus, the circuit courts have interpreted the
statute as indicating that, for purposes of CERCLA, a responsible party
can be a corporation and that the corporation may be found liable as
either an owner or an operator.
Courts which have interpreted the statute in this way use two
separate standards for determination of a parent corporation's liability:
the ability to control (an owner's derivative liability under common
law) and actual control (an operator's direct liability under CERCLA) 4
45See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209,1221 n.I I
(3rd Cir. 1993).
4642 U.S.C. § 9601(21). This section defines person as "an individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." Id.
4 7United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1 st Cir. 1990).
4879 F.3d 248 (2nd Cir. 1996).
491d. at 253.
504 F.3d 1209 (3rd Cir. 1993).
5tId. at 1221 n.ll.
52910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
531d. at 27.
54See Lansjbrd-Coaldale Joint Water Auth., 4 F.3d at 1220-2 1.
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A. Ability to control
In the1980s, the ability to control a subsidiary was enough to
hold a parent corporation liable under CERCLA.55 In Idaho v. Bunker
Hill Co.,56 the District Court of Idaho held a parent corporation liable
for its subsidiary's cleanup costs because it had the ability to control the
subsidiary's hazardous waste disposal. The court noted that normal
activities of a parent in regard to its subsidiary did not necessarily
warrant a finding that a parent was an owner or operator.58 The court
considered the parent's familiarity with the hazardous disposal at the
facility, the parent's capacity to control the releases, and the parent's
authority to take action to prevent and abate the damage in making its
decision.59 The District Court of Colorado, in Colorado v. Idarado
Mining Co.,6° relied on the Federal Water Pollution Control Act's
definition of "person in charge,"'" for determining if a parent was an
owner or operator. 62 This definition provides that "[t]he owner-operator
of a vessel or facility has the capacity to make timely discovery of oil
damages. The owner-operator has the power to direct the activities of
persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution. The owner-
operator has the capacity to prevent and abate the damage. '63 The court
also examined the percentage of the subsidiary's stock owned by the
parent and the extent the parent controlled the subsidiary's marketing
and selection, supervision, and transfer of the subsidiary's employees.'
In Vermont v. Staco, Inc.,65 the District Court of Vermont based
55See generally Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988); Colorado v.
Idarado Mining Co., 18 ELR 20578 (D. Colo. 1987); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665
(D. Idaho 1986).
56635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
57See id. at 671-72.
5 8See id. at 672.
5 9See id. at 672.
6018 ELR 20578 (D. Colo. 1987).
6 1Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
62Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 ELR 20578, at *3 (D. Colo. 1987).
631d. at *3. See also United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir 1972).
'See Idarado Mining Co., 18 ELR 20578, at *3.
65684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988).
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CERCLA liability on responsibility rather than fault.66 The court
interpreted CERCLA to impose strict liability on both owners and
operators of a facility that released hazardous substances.67
Finally, in United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,68 the District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reasoned that a parent corporation
could be liable under CERCLA for its subsidiary's contamination if it
actively participated in the management of its subsidiary.69
B. Actual Control
In the 1 990s, courts required more than the ability to control to
hold parent corporations liable under CERCLA.70 Rather, courts
required that parent corporations exert actual control over the
subsidiary.7' In United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,72 the court held
that a parent would be liable if it was actively involved in the
subsidiary's activities.73  The court stated that "[t]o be an operator
requires more than merely complete ownership and the concomitant
general authority or ability to control that comes with ownership. At a
minimum it requires active involvement in the activities of the
subsidiary.
'' 1
In Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp.,7'
the court rejected this "authority-to-control" test and adopted the "actual
control" test.76 The court stated that "[u]nder the actual control standard
... a corporation cannot hide behind the corporate form to escape
liability in those instances in which it played an active role in the
management of a corporation responsible for environmental
66See id. at 83 1.
67See id. at 83 1.
68712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Penn. 1989).
6 9See id. at 1203.70See Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1997);
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993); United States
v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990).
7 See id.
72910 F.2d 24 (st Cir. 1990).
73See id. at 27.
74 See id. at 27.
754 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1993).
76See id. at 1221.
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wrongdoing."" Finally, in Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East,
Inc. ,7 the court adopted the Lansford-Coaldale "actual control"
standard and rejected the "authority-to-control" test.7 9
In at least one Fifth Circuit case, a court has followed
corporate veil-piercing analysis to determine parent corporation
liability.80 In Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc.,8' the Fifth
Circuit concluded that CERCLA's definition of "owners" and
"operators" did not include parent corporations of offending
subsidiaries 2.8  The court based its conclusion on the common law
principle of limited liability of corporations.83 Further, the court held
that veil-piercing should be limited to situations where the corporate
entity is used to perpetrate fraud or avoid liability."
It is this disagreement among the circuits as to the
appropriateness of finding direct operator liability under CERCLA in
the absence of a finding of derivative liability under common law that
forms the core issue before the Supreme Court in United States v.
Best(foods.
IV. OPINION AND REASONING
In Bestfoods, the Court established a clear, two prong rule for
determining when a parent corporation should be held liable under
CERCLA.85 First, a parent corporation may be liable as an owner for
its subsidiary's actions when the corporate veil is pierced under
common law principles.86 Second, a parent may be directly liable as an
operator under CERCLA, if the parent "manage[s], direct[s], or
conduct[s] operations specifically related to pollution, that is,
operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous
waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental
77See id. at 122 1.
78 124 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1997).
79See id. at 563.




95Bestjbods, 118 S.Ct. at 1876.
86See id. at 1886.
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regulations." ' In this way, the Supreme Court clearly distinguished
derivative from direct corporate liability. The Court held that active
participation and control over a subsidiary alone is not enough to create
liability unless the corporate veil may be pierced and derivative liability
found. 8 However, a parent that "actively participated in, and exercised
control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly
liable in its own right as an operator of the facility. '89 Finding such"
direct liability was the issue in Bestfoods.9 °
The Court analyzed the two standards of liability. First, the
Court looked at ownership and emphasized the common law's "bedrock
principle" that mere stock ownership of a subsidiary does not create
liability. 9' Nothing in CERCLA, the Court noted, changes this as "the
Government has ... made no claim that a corporate parent is liable as
an owner or an operator.., simply because its subsidiary is subject to
liability." 92 The Court also noted the fundamental principle that
shareholders may be held liable "when, inter alia, the corporate form
would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes,"
thus piercing the corporate veil.93 Once pierced, derivative CERCLA
liability may attach to the parent.94
The Court then looked at the liability of operators. Drawing on
the writings of Justice Douglas, the Court emphasized the distinction
between derivative liability cases and direct liability cases.9" Direct
liability attaches to the parent as a result of the wrongs it commits
itself,96 and, the Supreme Court emphasized, CERCLA does nothing to
change this. "[N]othing in the statute's terms bars a parent corporation
from direct liability for its own actions in operating a facility owned by
87Id. at 1887.
88See id.
891d. at 1881 (emphasis added).






95See id. at 1886.
9 6See id.
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its subsidiary."97 With a finding of direct liability, the issue of the
parent-subsidiary relationship becomes "simply irrelevant."
98
The lack of clarity in CERCLA's definition of "operator" led
the Court to turn to the plain meaning of the term in order to identify
whether there had been "direct parental operation" of the facility. 99 In
defining the term, the Court held that "under CERCLA, an operator is
simply someone who directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the
affairs of a facility" and sharpened the definition by relating it
specifically to polluting activity."'
With this background and understanding, the Court ruled the
Sixth Circuit correct in rejecting the district court's finding of direct
liability.' ' The district court had erred in fusing direct and indirect
liability." 2 By focusing its analysis on the relationship between the two
corporations, the district court failed to look at the interaction between
the parent and the facility.'0 3 Control of the facility gives rise to direct
liability on the part of the parent." The factors involved in the
relationship between the parent and subsidiary corporation (such as
involvement in the board of directors) are sufficient only for derivative
liability and only if the corporate veil may be pierced. In using these
relationship factors as a basis to find direct liability, the district court
failed to recognize that "it is entirely appropriate for directors of a
parent corporation to serve as directors of its subsidiary, and that fact
alone may not serve to expose the parent corporation to liability for its
subsidiary's acts."'05
The Supreme Court noted that such an error in analysis treats
CERCLA as if it supplants the common law. This approach would




99See id. at 1887.
100Id.
10 1See id. at 1887.
102See id.
"°3See id.
'°9See id. at 1886.
1051d. at 1888 (quoting American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 57(2nd Cir.
"°6See id. at 1889.
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not to be found in CERCLA.' °7 Based on this analysis, the Court held
that the use of a participation and control test to analyze the parent's
control over the subsidiary (versus the facility) inappropriate to find
direct liability.08
Returning again to the meaning of the term "operate," the
Supreme Court went on to rule that the court of appeals did not fully
analyze whether CPC was actually operating the facility.'19 Direct
liability might be found by looking at whether dual officers or directors
were in fact acting on behalf of the parent instead of the subsidiary, or
if an agent of the parent managed or directed activities at the facility." 0
The existence of G.R.D. Williams, who worked only for the parent,
raises the possibility of such direct control."' The Court wrote, "The
critical question is whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the
facility by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted
norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility."" 2 Given the
high level of dispute over the role Williams played, the Court remanded
the case back to the district court to evaluate his role, and that of any
other agent, in possessing direct control over the subsidiary's facility." 3
V. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted CERCLA to facilitate the cleanup of
hazardous substances, and to charge responsible parties, rather than
taxpayers, with the costs of the cleanup."14 Accordingly, CERCLA
allows the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "to seek
injunctions to compel responsible parties to clean up hazardous waste
sites that constitute an imminent and substantial endangerment to health





'I'See id. at 1890.
1121d. at 1889.
113See id. at 1890.
1 See Amy C. Stovall, Limiting Operator Liability For Parent Corporations Under
CERCLA: United Sates v. Cordova Chemical Co., 43 VILL. L. REV. 219, 225 (1998).
1 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 731
(8th Cir. 1985).
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reach all parties responsible for the environmental damage." 6 In order
to address Congress' concerns, courts must construe the statute
liberally." 7 Prior to the Bestfoods decision, lower courts disagreed as
to the correct standard to determine a parent corporation's liability." 8
Now a bright line test for all jurisdictions to follow has been
established."9
In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court's decision is consistent with
Congress' intention, as it construes the statute liberally in order to hold
the parties responsible for contamination and liable for the cleanup
costs. The Court's holding extinguishes the "beacon of hope" alluded
to at the beginning of this comment, by holding that a parent
corporation is liable for cleanup costs when the corporate veil is
pierced, as well as when the corporation directly operates the
contaminating facility. ° The Court determined that the verb "to
operate" meant mechanically activating pumps and valves and the
exercise of direction over a facility's activities.' 2' The Court further
explained that its definition of "to operate" included a parent
corporation operating a facility alongside its subsidiary or operating a
facility itself.22 As a result of this decision, the parties actually in
control of contaminating facilities will be required to pay the costs.
Due to this bright line test established by Bestfoods, parent
corporations, not just their subsidiaries, will be discouraged from
committing violations in the future. Because it will no longer be
questionable whether or not a parent corporation should be held liable
for the cleanup costs, corporations that own and operate subsidiaries
will be encouraged to comply with environmental regulations. They
will either avoid causing contamination or initiate the necessary steps
to provide for the proper cleanup of contaminated sites. In the future,
if parent corporations are not willing to avoid contamination or to pay
for cleanup, then they will refrain from operating subsidiaries in a
116See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2nd Cir. 1996).
" 7 See id.; B.F. Goodrich, Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992); Anspec
Co., v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1990).
'1 'See Stovall, supra note 115, at 283.
...See Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1876.
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manner that causes contamination. The result of the Bestfoods decision
will be to further Congress' ultimate goal of reducing contamination
and charging responsible parties for the costs of cleaning up hazardous
waste sites.
